In his essay Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation, published by the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala, S.L. Kuzmin writes that the agreement had critical shortcomings.  The use of new personal seals instead of official state seals was not legal. Tibetan delegates exceeded their authority by signing the agreement without the agreement of the Dalai Lama and the Kashag. The preamble to the agreement contained ideological stereotypes that do not correspond to reality. The Chinese government ordered the PLA soldiers who had entered Tibet to order the “local” government to send their people to negotiate with the centre (i.e. the central government); the parties recognized it in the preamble and in point 2, so that the agreement was signed under military threat. The agreement was drafted in such a way that a number of terms were ambiguous and allowed for different interpretations on the part of the Chinese and Tibetans. It also contains some internal contradictions.  The 17-point agreement is a very important valid historical document that reveals the true nature of Sino-Tibetan relations at this decisive turning point in the history of Tibetan independence.
Although it was imposed on the Tibetan government by Communist China, it remains an important testimony that Tibet was never part of China before the agreement. Following the occupation on 23 May 1951 of the capital of the eastern province of Chamdo, the People`s Republic of China (CHINA POPULAR REPUBLIC), Tibet forced to sign the 17-point agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. The alternative, according to the occupying forces, is an immediate military operation in the rest of Tibet. Photo after Claude Arpi`s exhibition. They are sent a draft treaty and asked to review it. No further instructions are given. We expect you to know what the client wants without asking. In the case of technology-related agreements, they might think that you don`t need to know the object or that you won`t understand it. On the way to exile in India, the 14th Dalai Lama arrived on 26 March 1959 in Lhuntse Dzong, where he reaffirmed the 17-point agreement as a “threat of arms to the Tibetan government and the Tibetan people” and reaffirmed his government as tibet`s only legitimate representative.   On 20 June 1959, at a press conference in Mussoorie, the 14th Dalai Lama again rejected the agreement and stated that “China itself has violated the terms of its own agreement, there can no longer be a legal basis for recognizing it.”  Much to the chagrin of Communist China, the 17-point agreement of 1951 remains an important document to prove that Tibet was an independent nation before the Chinese invasion. However, since Tibetans do not seek to separate from China, the document can play a decisive role in finding common ground based on the approach of his Holiness` means, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan administration in exile.